

The Development of Hobbes's Theory of the State of Nature

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Introduction

It is well known that Hobbes, in his theory of the state of nature, describes the state as a state of war and talks about a way out of such a state. By contrast, it is not so widely recognized that he presents the theory differently in different books.¹ For example, there is at least a terminological difference. In *Leviathan*, he does not use, as he does in the earlier two works, the term "state" or "estate" to refer either to the state of nature or to a state of war. He uses instead the term "condition." The relevant terminologies are as follows respectively.

<i>Elements</i>	the estate of nature	a state of war
	the state of nature	
<i>De Cive</i>	status naturae	status belli
<i>Leviathan</i>	the condition of mere nature	a condition of war

As is suggested by this terminological difference, there are in fact considerable differences between the theory of nature he presents in *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and the one he presents in *Leviathan*, on the other. Our aim in this paper is to identify and explain such differences and thereby to appreciate the significance of the position Hobbes came to espouse in *Leviathan*. In section 1, we shall identify two major differences. One concerns his proof that the state (condition) of nature is a state (condition) of war, and the other concerns his explanation of how people get out of such a state (condition). In section 2, we shall concentrate on the latter difference and explain it as a result of the change in his attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture. In section 3, we shall concentrate on the former difference and explain it as a result of the change in his understanding of such fundamental concepts as the right and law of nature, and hence of the concept of nature itself. We shall see in the end that, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes completely revised the theory of nature he had presented in *Elements* and *De Cive*.

Our chief concern is Hobbes's discussion about the state (condition) of nature and related matters, in particular, the concept of right and law of nature. They are subject matters treated in Chapters 13 and 14 of *Leviathan* and the corresponding chapters of *Elements* and *De Cive*. They are entitled as follows respectively.

<i>Elements</i>	Chapter 14	Of the Estate and Right of Nature
	Chapter 15	Of the Divesting of Natural Right by Gift and Covenant
<i>De Cive</i>	Caput 1	De statu Hominum extra societatem
	Caput 2	De Lege Naturae circa Contractus
<i>Leviathan</i>	Chapter 13	Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their Felicity and Misery
	Chapter 14	Of the first and second Natural Laws, and of Contract

1 The State of Nature as a State of War

In this section, we shall present in outline Hobbes's account of the state (condition) of nature and thereby show that there are two major differences between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account, on the one hand, and the *Leviathan* account, on the other. However, since the *Elements* and the *De Cive* accounts are fundamentally the same, we shall mainly concentrate on the comparison between the *Elements* and the *Leviathan* accounts. That is, though we shall examine the *Elements* and the *Leviathan* accounts at some length, we shall refer to the *De Cive* account only in so far as it is necessary to do so. Let us start with looking at the *Elements* account.

1.1 The *Elements* account of the state of nature

It is in Chapter 14 of *Elements* that Hobbes describes the state of nature as a state of war and talks about a way out of such a state. Let us take up these two points in turn.

Hobbes puts the conclusion of his proof that the state of nature is a state of war in these terms: “the estate of men in this natural liberty is the estate of war” (El: 14, 11, 80). He characterizes the state of nature as a state of natural liberty. The state of natural liberty is a state where everyone enjoys liberty or the right of nature, which is nothing else but a right to everything. Therefore, one premise based on which he proves that the state of nature is a state of war is this: Everyone by nature has a right to everything. To anticipate the point I shall make in section 3 of this paper, as far as *Elements* and *De Cive* are concerned, what he means by “nature” when he talks about the right of nature is nature in the normative sense. Now, there is another premise to the proof in question, which says that men are by nature offensive to one another. What he means by “nature” when he talks about men's offensiveness is the physical and psychological makeup of human beings. It is nature in the factual, as opposed to the normative, sense. Thus, in his proof that the state of nature is a state of war, two different concepts of nature are at work: the normative and the factual concepts. However, as is suggested by the title of the chapter “Of the Estate and Right of Nature,” the normative concept is the more fundamental. Anyway, the proof is based on the following two premises.

- (a) Men are by nature offensive to one another.
- (b) Everyone by nature has a right to everything.

Let us next see in turn how Hobbes establishes each of the two premises. His argument for premise (a) starts with the statement of the natural equality of men. According to Hobbes, men are little different in both physical and mental abilities from one another. In addition, there is no great difficulty for the weaker to kill the stronger. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that men are by nature equal. Or, as he puts it, “we may conclude that men considered in mere nature, *ought to* admit amongst themselves equality” (Ibid., 2, 78, emphasis added). Notice that he talks about the natural equality of men in normative terms, which reveals that, in this case too, the normative concept of nature is operative.

Having established the natural equality of men, Hobbes goes on to present three factors that lead to the natural offensiveness of men, namely, vanity, comparison and appetite.

In spite of the natural equality, there are great differences among men where their passions are concerned. That is, some are vainly glorious and are not willing to admit their equality with others. Such people, assuming often by mistake their superiority over others, attempt to subdue them. It follows thence that even those who are moderate and who are contented with the equality of nature are exposed to the force of others. As a result there arises "a general diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another" (Ibid., 3, 78).

Furthermore, men desire to be superior to others, and hate to be matched or excelled in one respect or another by them. So men are disposed to provoke one another by comparison, that is, by words and other signs that show their contempt for others, and eventually come to resort to violence in order to determine the preeminence.

Finally, it often happens that many people have an appetite for the same object, which sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common nor divided. In such cases the stronger is to enjoy the object and it is a battle or fight that determines who is the stronger.

Having presented these three factors, Hobbes concludes that men are by nature offensive to one another. Or, as he puts it, "the greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do nevertheless, through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke the rest, that otherwise would be contented with equality" (Ibid., 5, 78).

Let us next turn to Hobbes's argument for premise (b). The argument falls into several stages. First, Hobbes proves that everyone has a natural right to self-preservation. The proof takes the form of syllogism, which may be formulated like this.

Whatever is not against reason is, by definition, a right.

It is not against reason for everyone to seek his preservation. (For it is by the necessity of nature that everyone does so.)

Therefore, (1) it is a right of nature for everyone to seek his preservation.

Following this, Hobbes presents and proves two more propositions that are necessary for deriving the required conclusion that the natural right to self-preservation amounts to a right to everything.

(2) A right to the end implies a right to the necessary means.

(3) It is a right of nature for everyone to be the judge of the means necessary to his preservation.

The proof of proposition (2) is quite simple. It is impossible for anyone to attain the end without using the necessary means. Therefore, where a person has a right to the end, it is not against reason and hence a right of nature for him to use all means necessary for attaining the end. By contrast, the proof of proposition (3) is somewhat complex and runs like this. If it were against reason that I should be the judge of the necessary means of my preservation, then someone else would be the judge. This means that someone else would judge whether or not my judgment concerning the necessary means of my preservation is correct. On the same ground that someone else is the judge of my judgment, I am also the judge of his judgment. Therefore, it is not against reason and hence a right of nature for me to be the judge of his judgment concerning the necessary means of my preservation and hence to be the judge of the necessary means of my preservation.

Anyway, based on the three propositions (1), (2) and (3), Hobbes derives the required conclusion that everyone by nature has a right to everything in the following manner.

It is a right of nature for everyone to seek his preservation.

Since a right to the end implies a right to the necessary means, it is also a right of nature for everyone to do whatever is necessary to his preservation.

It is a right of nature for everyone to be the judge of the means necessary to his preservation.

Therefore, it is a right of nature for everyone to do whatever he judges is necessary to his preservation. That is, everyone by nature has a right to everything.

The two premises (a) and (b) having been established, Hobbes is finally in a position to complete his proof that the state of nature is a state of war. It goes like this.

Seeing then to the offensiveness of man's nature one to another, there is added a right of every man to every thing, whereby one man invadeth with right, and another with right resisteth; and men live thereby in perpetual diffidence, and study how to preoccupate each other; the estate of men in this natural liberty is the estate of war. (Ibid., 11, 80)

Having described the state of nature as a state of war, Hobbes goes on to discuss a way out of such a state. Based on the natural necessity of everyone's seeking self-preservation, he first argues that it is self-contradictory for anyone to desire to stay in a state of war, which threatens his preservation. The relevant passage is worth quoting at length.

The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another...: he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate, as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, *contradicteth himself*. For every man by *natural necessity* desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men by nature equal, and able to destroy one another. (Ibid., 12, 80, emphasis added)

Notice that he has recourse to such concepts as natural necessity and self-contradiction. Roughly speaking, he regards our getting out of a state of war and turning to peace as an event that necessarily happens. However, the story is a little more complex, because it depends on the actions on the others' part whether or not we actually do such things as are necessary for the establishment of peace. We seek peace in so far as there is hope of obtaining it. Precisely speaking, therefore, he regards our getting out of a state of war and turning to peace as an event that, if it happens at all, necessarily happens.

Accordingly, he concludes the discussion of Chapter 14 with the following statement.

Reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good, to seek after peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same; and to strengthen himself with all the help he can procure, for his own defence against those, from whom such peace cannot be obtained; and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto. (Ibid., 14, 81)

Though we do not examine here the *De Cive* account of the state of nature, it is fundamentally the same as the *Elements* account. By contrast, as we shall see in the next section, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes gives quite a different account.

1.2 The *Leviathan* account of the condition of nature

It is in Chapter 13 of *Leviathan* that Hobbes describes the condition of nature as a condition of war and talks about a way out of such a condition. In so far as it deals with these two points, the *Leviathan* account of the condition of nature is not different from the *Elements* and *De Cive* account. However, when it comes to the substance of discussion, there are considerable differences between the two accounts.

Hobbes puts the conclusion of his proof that the condition of nature is a condition of war in these terms: “during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre” (Lev: 13, 8, 185). In *Leviathan*, he does not, as he does in *Elements*, characterize the condition of nature positively as a condition of liberty. Instead, he characterises it negatively as a condition without a common power. This leads to one of the two major differences between the *Elements* and the *Leviathan* accounts. That is, in the latter account, in drawing the conclusion in question he relies only on premise (a), which is formulated in terms of the factual concept of nature, and excludes premise (b), which is formulated in terms of the normative concept of nature. Incidentally, in *De Cive*, he puts the conclusion of his proof in these terms: “the natural state of men, before they came together into society, was War” (Cive: 1, 12, 96). So, as far as the terms in which he puts the conclusion are concerned, the *De Cive* account is similar to the *Leviathan* account. However, the *De Cive* account is fundamentally the same as the *Elements* account in that it relies both on premises (a) and (b).

In *Leviathan*, as well as in *Elements* and *De Cive*, the argument for premise (a) starts with the statement of the natural equality of men. Hobbes says that nature has made men basically equal in the abilities of body and mind. So that the difference between them, if there are any, is not so considerable as to enable one man to have a better claim than another to any benefit. For, as to the strength of body, the weakest is strong enough to kill the strongest by plot and alliance. As to the abilities of the mind, it is true that, because of their “vain conceit of ones own wisdome” (Lev: 13, 2, 183), most people believing themselves to be more prudent or wiser than the rest, few are ready to admit the equality in question. But, this proves rather that men are equal in such abilities as prudence and wisdom, than unequal. “For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share” (Ibid., 2, 184).

Thus, in all three works, Hobbes asserts that men are by nature equal. However, there are two points worth mentioning. First, in *Leviathan* and *De Cive*, he does not use, as he does in *Elements*, normative terms to state the natural equality. Second, in *Leviathan*, unlike in *Elements* and *De Cive*, he adds a qualifying comment to the statement of the natural equality. He admits that not all people have scientific knowledge to the same degree. Given that science is a product of reason, this amounts to saying that reason is an exception to the natural equality among men of the faculties of the mind. The first point is related to his getting rid of the normative concept of

nature, which we shall treat in detail later on in section 3 of his paper. The second is related to the change in his attitude toward humanist, rhetorical culture, which we shall treat in section 2 of this paper.

Having established the natural equality of men, Hobbes proceeds to the presentation of three factors that lead to the natural offensiveness of men, namely, competition, diffidence and glory.

Given the equality of ability among men, there arises the equality of hope in attaining their end. Therefore, if two people desire the same object, which they both cannot enjoy at the same time, they compete with each other for it. In particular, in the way to their end, such as self-preservation, people “endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another” (Ibid., 3, 184), if necessary. Hence it comes about “where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power” (Ibid., 3, 184), everyone is exposed to constant danger of others’ depriving him not only of what he has gained but also of his life. To put it another way, people are in a situation of mutual diffidence.

In such a condition of mutual diffidence, there is no better way for anyone to ensure security than anticipation, that is, taking any necessary measures to master as many people as possible. In addition, some people take pleasure in contemplating their power exercised in such acts of conquest as are not necessary for their security. In the presence of such people, those who otherwise would be contented to be within their modest bounds are also forced to increase their power by invasion for their security.

Moreover, men are creatures of glory, who “have no pleasure, ... in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all” (Ibid., 5, 185). Everyone demands that others should value him as highly as he values himself. So that if he finds any signs of contempt or undervaluation in actions of others, he is ready to try to win a higher valuation on himself from those who undervalue him by actually injuring or otherwise harming them, and from others by using such an act of harm as an example to them. This, “amongst them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other” (Ibid.).

These three factors, competition, diffidence and glory, constitute the natural offensiveness of men. That is, they each lead men to make invasion and use violence.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, ... (Lev: 13, 7, 185)

That argument for the men’s natural offensiveness, namely for premise (a), which we have just seen, is not exactly the same as the corresponding arguments in *Elements* and *De Cive*. For example, the treatment of the three factors — competition, diffidence and glory — in *Leviathan* is somewhat different both in content and order from the treatment of the three factors — vanity, comparison and appetite — in the earlier two works. Furthermore, in *Leviathan*, in accordance with his negative characterization of the condition of nature, Hobbes refers to such characterization in his argument

for premise (a), too. However, as we have already mentioned, still more remarkable is the role premise (a) plays in the derivation of the conclusion that the condition of nature is a condition of war. This constitutes one of the two major differences between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account, on the one hand, and the *Leviathan* account, on the other. In the earlier two works, premise (a) is one of the two premises from which Hobbes draws the conclusion, the other being premise (b). By contrast, in *Leviathan*, he draws the conclusion immediately from premise (a) alone. Just after having presented the three factors that constitute the men's natural offensiveness, he says as follows.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. (Ibid., 8, 185)

As a natural consequence of his omitting premise (b) from the proof that the condition of nature is a condition of war, Hobbes comes to deal with natural right differently. For one thing, he first introduces the right of nature in Chapter 14 and not in Chapter 13 of *Leviathan*, the latter being the *Leviathan* counterpart of Chapter 14 of *Elements* and Chapter 1 of *De Cive*, where he introduces the right of nature. For another, and more important, he presents a new understanding of natural right. To put it concisely, according to the *Elements* and *De Cive* account, natural right is a right that belongs to people in the state of nature, whereas, according to the *Leviathan* account, natural right is a right that belongs to people in a condition of war. Given the description in all three works of the state or condition of nature as a state or condition of war, we have to say a lot more to explain the difference between a right in the state of nature and a right in a condition of war. However, putting off the detailed treatment of this point and related matters until section 3 of this paper, let us next turn to the *Leviathan* account of a way out of a condition of war. We shall find there the other major difference between *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and *Leviathan*, on the other.

Following the proof that the condition of nature is a condition of war, Hobbes turns to describe what such a condition is like. Having completed this task, he says like this.

And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a *possibility* to come out of it, consisting partly in the *Passions*, partly in his *Reason*.

The *Passions* that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And *Reason* suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. (Ibid., 13-14, 188, emphasis added)

What is characteristic of this account is that it talks about the possibility, and not the necessity, of getting out of a condition of war. As we have already seen, the point of the *Elements* and *De Cive* account of a way out of a state of war is this. Given the natural necessity of our seeking

self-preservation, it is self-contradictory for us to desire to remain in a state of war, which threatens our preservation. Thus, the *Elements* and *De Cive* account relies on such concepts as natural necessity and self-contradiction, and tries to present our turning from war to peace as a logical consequence of rational argument. By contrast, the *Leviathan* account cited above makes reference neither to the natural necessity of our seeking self-preservation nor to the self-contradiction of our remaining in a condition of war. Instead of presenting a rational argument based on natural necessity and self-contradiction, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes relies both on *reason* and *passion* to show the *possibility* of our getting out of a condition of war.

We have identified two major differences between the account of the state of nature Hobbes presents in *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and the account in *Leviathan*, on the other. One concerns the proof that the state or condition of nature is a state or condition of war. The other concerns the explanation of how we get out of a state or condition of war. The former is closely connected with the change in his understanding of natural right. The latter consists in the change in his manner of presenting argument. Our next task is to reveal what underlies each of the two differences and thereby to make a full sense of them. We shall treat the latter difference first in the next section, before dealing with the former one in sections 3.

2 Hobbes's Wavering between the Two Cultures

In his explanation of how we get out of a state or condition of war, Hobbes gives two different manners of argument. In this section, we shall describe the change in his presentation of argument as a result of the change in his attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture. In order to achieve this task it is necessary first to see that he formed himself intellectually in two different intellectual climates. One is the Renaissance humanism and the other is the scientific revolution in the sixteenth to seventeenth century.

2.1 Humanism and science, and their influence on Hobbes's intellectual formation²

It is well known that the scientific revolution, which arose from the Continent in the sixteenth century, made a great contribution to the intellectual formation of Hobbes. However, it was not until the 1630s that the scientific revolution began to influence his thought, and his first intellectual formation was made in the Renaissance humanist culture. In fact, soon after the graduation from Oxford in 1608, he served the Cavendish family as a tutor and secretary, and started his career as a humanist intellectual. So it will help to take a brief look at the main features of the humanist culture prevalent at that time in England.

It was the cultural tradition of ancient Rome that had made the greatest contribution to the formation of the Renaissance humanist culture. The importance attached to the art of rhetoric, one of the most remarkable features of the humanist culture, was no exception. According to the view of the Roman rhetoricians, the importance attached to the art of rhetoric is intimately connected with the ideal of the citizen as a member of the commonwealth. The citizen, who is to

play an important role in the commonwealth, is of course required to have *ratio* or reason, namely the ability to find out the truth. However, it is not enough for him to have reason. He is also required to have *eloquentia* or eloquence, namely the ability to present the truth found out persuasively. This ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, which was widely shared by the Roman rhetoricians, find a brief expression in Cicero's *De inventione*. Talking about the long thought he has given to the good and bad effects of eloquence on the human society, he presents the conclusion he has reached in terms of the relation between *sapientia* and *eloquentia*.

sapientia without *eloquentia* is little helpful to commonwealths, but *eloquentia* without *sapientia* is generally highly prejudicial to, and is not helpful at all to them. (I, I, 1)

In accordance with the ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, the Roman rhetoricians also held the view that *scientia civilis*, civil science or politics, is a product of the collaboration between reason and eloquence. This means that rhetoric as an art of persuasion is an indispensable part of civil science, to which Cicero's *De inventione* also makes a reference.

Therefore, according to our classification, the faculty of oratory is a part of civil science. It seems that the function of that faculty is to speak in a way appropriate to persuasion, and its end is to persuade by speech. (I, V, 6)

Now, the importance attached to the art of rhetoric, as well as the ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, which was at the heart of the cultural tradition of ancient Rome, was fully accepted by the Renaissance humanists. In fact, Cicero's *De inventione* was a major source from which they derived their understanding of the art of rhetoric and civil science.

When we turn to his intellectual career during the 1620s and 1630s, we find Hobbes was largely under the influence of the humanist culture. At that time, it was the five-part syllabus of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral or political philosophy that was commonly taken to form the core of the humanist studies. Descriptions in his autobiographies and references in his works to classical and contemporary writers show that his studies during the 1620s and 1630s ranged over all of these five subjects. In addition, such studies of his took the form of published works. He published *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre* (1629), which was an English translation of Thucydides's *History of Peloponnesian War*. When Hobbes tutored the third earl of Devonshire, he used as a textbook an abridged, Latin translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. He further rendered the Latin translation into English, and composed *A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique* (1637). These two works were not only results of his study of classical languages, but reflections of his interest in history and rhetoric respectively. Commemorating the excursion he made with the second earl of Devonshire, he composed a Latin poem entitled *De Mirabilibus Pecci* (1636). As for his early treatment of moral and political philosophy, there are three discourses, "Upon the Beginning of Tacitus," "Of Rome," and "Of Laws." These works, which constitute part of the anonymous collection of essays, entitled *Horae Subsecivae* (1620), are now commonly attributed to

Hobbes. Finally, *The Elements of Law*, his first systematic work, was also a product growing out of his humanistic interest in moral and political philosophy.

Not only was Hobbes interested in the humanistic studies in general, but he also espoused the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence. This further confirms his involvement in the humanist, rhetorical culture. In “Of the Life and History of Thucydides,” which is an appendix to his translation of Thucydides’s *History*, Hobbes proposes two points to be taken into account in making an evaluation of historical writings, namely truth and elocution.

Now for his writings, two things are to be considered in them: *truth* and *elocution*. For in *truth* consisteth the *soul*, and in *elocution* the *body* of history. The latter without the former, is but a picture of history; and the former without the latter, unapt to instruct. (Hist: xx)

No doubt, this is a version of the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence. Incidentally, evaluating Thucydides’s *History* in the light of the ideal, Hobbes judges that the work meets it and hence Thucydides is one of the greatest historians not only for his truthfulness but also for his excellent elocution.

Hobbes continued humanistic studies even in the 1630s. However, after about 1630, the intellectual climate surrounding him began to change. That is, he came to have a growing interest in scientific rather than humanist studies. Several factors, connected with some noblemen, contributed to this change. One such nobleman was Sir Gervase Clifton. Hobbes accompanied his son also named Gervase on his tour of the Continent in 1629-30. For Hobbes it was the second visit to the Continent, during which he had an important experience. It was the so-called discovery of geometry, which in particular opened his eyes to a geometrical, axiomatic method of reasoning. Aubrey, a biographer of Hobbes, reports the event in these terms.

He was forty years old before he looked on Geometry, which happened accidentally, being in a Gentleman’s Library in ..., a Euclid’s *Elements* lay open, and ’twas the 47th. Element liber I. He read the Proposition. ‘By G—,’ sayd he, this is impossible. So he reads the Demonstration of it, which referred him back to such a Proposition: which proposition he read: that referred him back to another which he also read, and sic deinceps [slowly but surely], that at last he was demonstratively convinced of that trueth. This made him in love with Geometry. (Aubrey 2000: 427-8)

After the discovery of geometry, in the 1630s, Hobbes began to work on scientific studies including optics. Two noblemen, both named William Cavendish, are important in this connection. Shortly after returning from the second visit to the Continent, Hobbes resumed employment with the Cavendish family, and looked after William, the third earl of Devonshire. At about the same time, he came to be closely associated with another branch of the Cavendish family, which was based in Welbeck and headed by William, the earl of Newcastle. The earl was a learned man interested in the new science, and had a group of scientists known as the Newcastle

circle, of which Hobbes was a member. He became interested in optics, the primary subject matter of the circle. As for another William, the third earl of Devonshire, Hobbes made the third visit to the Continent in 1634-6 with him. During his stay in the Continent, he became acquainted with some of the leading figures of the new science and philosophy. He met Galileo in Florence in 1636. More important, later in the same year, he met Marin Mersenne in Paris. He was a key figure of the seventeenth-century science and philosophy, around whom many scientists and philosophers, including René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi, gathered. Hobbes was introduced to Gassendi by Mersenne, though he would not meet Descartes until 1648 during his stay in France as an exile. Through the association with Mersenne and his circle he got further involved in optics among other fields of scientific studies. For the primary interest of the Mersenne circle was also optics, or how to make sense of the relationship between sense perception and the external world.

To put it concisely, it is the turn from humanistic to scientific studies that characterizes Hobbes in the 1630s. As a result of this turn, he stays away from the humanist, rhetorical culture for a certain period of time. *Elements* and *De Cive* are two principal works that belong to this period. However, by the time of his writing *Leviathan*, he returns to the humanist, rhetorical culture.³ We shall see his turn away from and return to it in sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.

2.2 Hobbes's turn away from the humanist, rhetorical culture

We have said that *Elements* is a product growing out of Hobbes's humanistic interest in moral and political philosophy. However, basically, it is a work that belongs to a new stage of his intellectual development, that is, the stage Hobbes reached after the discovery of geometry and the commitment to scientific studies including optics. In fact, *Elements* was so entitled after Euclid's *Elements*. Furthermore, a theory of perception that constitutes the opening chapters of the book is a product of his optical studies in the 1630s. As a result of his leaning toward the scientific, rational culture, he detaches himself from the humanist, rhetorical culture, and hence from the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence. This is apparent, for example in his distinction between the *mathematici* and the *dogmatici*.

In *Elements*, Hobbes distinguishes between two different kinds of learned men, *mathematici* and *dogmatici*. This is, for one thing, a difference between the subject matters they have handled. The *mathematici* are such learned men as "have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of magnitudes, numbers, times, and motions, and their proportions one to another" (El: 13, 3, 74). By contrast, the *dogmatici* are such learned men as "have written concerning the faculties, passions, and manners of men, that is to say, of moral philosophy, or of policy, government, and laws" (Ibid., 75).

According to Hobbes, the *mathematici* and the *dogmatici* are also different in their achievements, which difference he explains as a result of their following different ways of handling their subject matters. He says that we owe the *mathematici* every convenient thing that distinguishes us from savage people. For example, all such products of technological advancement in navigation, measurement, building, and so on, as we now enjoy have come from their studies. In addition, their studies, being free from controversy, have continually increased their results. This is the case

because they adopted the geometrical, deductive method of reasoning to prove the truth of their propositions. As he puts it, “they proceed from most low and humble principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on slowly, and with most scrupulous ratiocination (viz.) from the imposition of names they infer the truth of their first propositions; and from two of the first, a third; and from any two of the three a fourth; and so on, according to the steps of science” (Ibid., 74). By contrast, the studies of the *dogmatici*, far from removing controversy, have only multiplied it. Accordingly, in such subject matters as are treated by the *dogmatici*, our knowledge has little improved since the time of Aristotle. This is the case because “they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false” (Ibid., 75).

The difference between the *mathematici* and the *dogmatici* in their ways of handling their subject matters is connected with the difference of their aims. The *mathematici* aim at establishing the truth of their propositions by following “the steps of science,” while the *dogmatici* aim at only persuasion, that is, they only aim at making a hearer have whatever opinion, whether true or false, they have. Consequently, the latter resort to eloquence and allow passion, rather than reason, to play a central part in their project. For, as Hobbes puts it elsewhere in *Elements*, “Eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say,” and “the faculty of speaking powerfully, consisteth in a habit gotten of putting together passionate words, and applying them to the present passions of the hearer” (El: 27, 14, 171).

There is no doubt that the distinction between the *mathematici* and the *dogmatici* is an expression of Hobbes’s negative attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture and its products, on the one hand, and his positive attitude toward the scientific, rational culture and its products, on the other. Given the equal importance attached to truth and persuasion by the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, it is also clear that his attitude contradicts the ideal.

Let us turn to the opening pages of *Elements*, that is, to the Epistle Dedicatory, where we find the same attitude as we have just identified is expressed. Hobbes introduces the distinction between mathematical and dogmatical learning as a derivative from the distinction between reason and passion.

From the two principal parts of our nature, Reason and passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, mathematical and dogmatical. The former is free from controversies and dispute, because it consisteth in comparing figures and motion only; in which things truth and the interest of men oppose not each other. But in the later there is nothing not disputable, because it compareth men, and meddleth with their right and profit; in which, as oft as reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against reason. And from hence it cometh, that they that have written of justice and policy in general, do all invade each other, and themselves, with contradiction. (Ibid., ep. ded., 1, 19)

Following this comparison between reason and mathematical learning, on the one hand, and passion and dogmatical learning, on the other, he declares that he takes on the task of “reduc[ing]

this doctrine [of justice and policy] to the rules and infallibility of *reason*" (Ibid., emphasis added). To put it another way, he aims at establishing the doctrine of justice and policy, which has so far been a dogmatical learning, as a mathematical learning, that is, as a learning based not on passion but on reason. His project may also be described as one of a scientific, as opposed to a humanist, treatment of politics.

Hobbes admits, however, that such a project has carried a flaw with it.

For the style, it is therefore the worse, because whilst I was writing I consulted more with logic, than with rhetoric. (Ibid.)

For a better understanding of this statement, it will help to take a look at a passage in *De Cive*, where he explains the distinction between logic and rhetoric.

Now, there are two kinds of *eloquence* [*eloquentia*]. One consists in unfolding in a clear and elegant fashion the thought and conceptions of the mind, which arises partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, and partly from an understanding of words taken in their proper and definite signification. The other consists in moving the passions of the mind ..., which arises from a metaphorical use of words, adapted to the passions. The former composes speech from true principles, the latter from opinions already received, whatever kind they may be of. The art of the former is Logic [Logica], and of the latter Rhetoric [Rhetorica]. The end of the former is truth, and of the latter victory. (Cive: 12, 12, 192-3)⁴

Given this distinction between logic and rhetoric, his admission that he relied on logic rather than on rhetoric in his composition of *Elements* may be taken to be a reflection of his preference. That is, he prefers truth to persuasion in such a way as to contradict the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, which attaches equal importance to truth and persuasion.

As the passage cited above suggests, in *De Cive*, Hobbes still maintains a negative attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture, which is apparent for example in the division of philosophy he presents in the Epistle Dedicatory. He divides philosophy into several different branches according to their subject matters, that is, geometry, physics and morals. The branch that treats of figures is geometry, the one that treats of motion is physics, and the one that treats of natural right is morals. Now, corresponding to the distinction between mathematical and dogmatical learning, he makes a sharp distinction between geometry and physics, on the one hand, and morals, on the other. He sets a high value on geometry and physics on account of their contribution to the production of whatever is useful to human life and whatever distinguishes his time from the savage conditions of the past times. In particular, he describes geometry as its ultimate source, because in his view "*what we owe to Physics, Physics owes to Geometry*" (Ibid., ep. ded., 5, 74). By contrast, attributing the political confusion in England at the time of his composing *De Cive* to the underdevelopment of the knowledge of natural right, he says that "*what moral Philosophers have written up to now has contributed nothing to the knowledge of truth*" (Ibid., 7, 75). This amounts to

saying that there have been people called moral philosophers, but in fact their achievements fell far short of philosophy. As he puts it, “*Though their writings pleased people, it was the case not because they illuminated the mind but because, by making use of such speech as was attractive and favourable to the passions, they confirmed opinions blindly received*” (Ibid.). It is clear he has the humanist, rhetorical culture and its products in mind when he talks about morals. He reveals the same negative attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture, when he voices his conviction that the standard by which the dedicatee of his work, that is, the third earl of Devonshire, evaluates books is “*not the fame of authors, or the novelty of their opinions, or the outward beauty of their speech, but the firmness of their reasons*” (Ibid., 12, 76).

2.3 Hobbes’s return to the humanist, rhetorical culture

After his engagement with scientific studies, Hobbes came to stay away from the humanist, rhetorical culture. As a result, in contradiction to the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence, he favoured reason to eloquence, truth to persuasion. Accordingly, he attempted to establish the science of politics, which is based not on eloquence that aims at persuasion but on reason that aims at truth. *Elements* and *De Cive* were products of such an attempt. This is not to say that he was satisfied with truth without persuasion. His view was, rather, that reason is enough to persuasion. So the fact remains that he did not appreciate the necessity of complementing reason with eloquence. On the other hand, by the time of his writing *Leviathan*, he returned to the humanist, rhetorical culture, and espoused once again the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence. Particularly relevant in this connection is the concluding part of the book, where he makes a clear statement of the humanist ideal.

The statement in question is preceded by the presentation of a view prevalent among people on the relationship between reason and eloquence.

Again, in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable. (Lev: concl., 1, 717)

It is true that people admit that either reason or eloquence by itself is insufficient for the performance of good deliberations and pleadings. However, they take it impossible for both of them to stand together in the same person. By contrast, Hobbes thinks that it is very difficult, but not impossible. He says that “Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together” (Ibid., 4, 718), and thereby denies their incompatibility.

There is another considerable difference between *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and *Leviathan*, on the other, which is also a reflection of his return to the humanist, rhetorical culture.

We have seen that in the earlier two works Hobbes contrasts the scientists and their products in the field of natural philosophy, including geometry, on the one hand, with the humanists and their products in the field of moral and political philosophy, on the other. He approves the former, while he disapproves the latter. According to this contrasting evaluation of science and humanism, he takes on the task of bringing moral and political philosophy to a level comparable to natural philosophy, in other words, the task of establishing the science of morals and politics. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes ceases to define his task in relation to his critical attitude toward the humanist treatment of moral and political philosophy. It is true that he criticises the results writers before him have brought about in the field of philosophy in general and of moral and political philosophy in particular. He devotes one whole chapter, namely Chapter 46, to the criticism of what he calls "vain philosophy." However, he directs his criticism not at humanism but mainly at scholasticism based on the authority of Aristotle.

This is not to say that, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes accepts the humanist, rhetorical culture without reservation. In fact, not only does he often make critical remarks on the art of rhetoric or eloquence, but he also retains the project of establishing the science of morals and politics. For example, he describes his doctrine of the laws of nature as "true Morall Philosophie," that is, as "the Science of what is *Good*, and *Evill*, in the conversation, and Society of mankind" (Lev: 15, 40, 216). As for his remarks on eloquence, he refers to it negatively as "seeming Wisdome" (Ibid., 11, 16, 164). To give another example, comparing the social life of men and that of such creatures as bees and ants, he says that these creatures want "that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure" (Ibid., 17, 10, 226). Though he does not refer directly to eloquence, what he means by "that art of words" is eloquence. This becomes apparent, when we compare the remark just cited with the corresponding one in *De Cive*.

The function of eloquence is to make the *Good* and the *evil*, the *useful* and the *useless*, the *Honourable* and the *dishonourable* appear more or less so than they really are, and to make the *unjust* appear *Just*, according as it may seem to serve the speaker's end. (Cive: 10, 11, 177-8)

Nevertheless, the fact remains that Hobbes changed his attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture and returned to the humanist ideal of a union between reason and eloquence. This implies that he accepted the Ciceroian view of civil science or politics as a product of the collaboration between reason and eloquence, and appreciated the relevance of eloquence to politics. Politics is not a mere theoretical construction based on reason and aiming at truth. It is also a practical device aiming at persuasion. It is something that is to be accepted by people and thereby to have some influence on their thought and action. If this is the case, in addition to reason, eloquence is a powerful weapon of politics. The use of eloquence does not disagree with the construction of the science of politics; its proper use is, rather, indispensable for it. This is the position Hobbes came to espouse in *Leviathan*. Of course, as we have mentioned above, it was not the case that, in

Elements and *De Cive*, he paid no attention at all to an element of persuasion. However, deeply affected by the scientific, rational culture, when he attempted to establish the science of politics in those two works, he failed to give its aspect as a practical device due consideration and hence failed to appreciate the relevance of eloquence to politics.

2.4 Hobbes's new presentation of argument in *Leviathan*

Let us remember here that we have left unexplained the fact that Hobbes treats a way out of a state or condition of war differently in *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and in *Leviathan*, on the other. Having taken a detailed look at the change in his attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture, that is, his turning away from and returning to it, we are now in a position to give an explanation of the fact. Furthermore, the same change is related to an exception he admits in *Leviathan* to the natural equality of men.⁵

Hobbes's return to the humanist, rhetorical culture had a significant impact on the presentation of argument. This is apparent, for example, in a famous passage in *Leviathan*, where Hobbes describes the miseries of a condition of war in very impressive terms.

In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (Lev: 13, 9, 186)

When we turn to the corresponding descriptions in *Elements* and *De Cive*, we find that they are brief and flat compared with the one in *Leviathan*.

..., where we find the people few and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of life, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured. (El: 14, 12, 80)

..., they were then few, savage, short lived, poor and nasty, and without the comforts and ornaments of life, which are usually provided by *peace* and society. (Cive: 1, 13, 96)

The passages just cited are followed immediately by the explanation of how we get out of such a state. We have cited in section 1.1 the relevant passage in *Elements*. In *De Cive*, Hobbes gives fundamentally the same explanation.

Therefore, anyone who holds that one should remain in that state, in which all is allowed to all, *contradicts himself*; for every man by *natural necessity* desires his own good, but no one regards the *war* of all against all which naturally attends such a state as his own good. And so it comes about that, we are driven by mutual fear to think that we should get out of such a state and seek associates; so that, if we are to have war, it may not be a war against all, nor

without auxiliaries. (Ibid., 96-7, emphasis added, that on *war* excepted)

As we have already mentioned, what is characteristic of the *Elements* and *De Cive* account of a way out of a state of war is this. It relies on such concepts as natural necessity and self-contradiction, and tries to present our turning from war to peace as a logical consequence of rational argument. That is, Hobbes talks about the necessity of our getting out of a state of war. By contrast, as we have seen in section 1.2, in *Leviathan*, he talks about not the necessity but the possibility of our getting out of a condition of war. Accordingly, he makes reference neither to the natural necessity of our seeking self-preservation nor to the self-contradiction of our remaining in a condition of war. Instead of presenting a rational argument based on natural necessity and self-contradiction, he relies both on *reason* and *passion* to show the *possibility* in question.

This change in the presentation of argument can be explained as a result of the change in the attitude toward the humanist, rhetorical culture. Strongly affected by the scientific, rational culture, in the early 1630s, Hobbes began to detach himself from the humanist, rhetorical culture, and stayed away from it for a certain period of time. In the two political writings *Elements* and *De Cive*, which were written in that period, he worked on the project of establishing the science of politics. To put it another way, he worked on the project of a scientific, as opposed to a humanist, treatment of politics. In carrying out this project, he relied on reason and not on passion. For, as we have seen in section 2.2, Hobbes at that time, associating reason with the scientific, rational culture, and passion with the humanist, rhetorical culture, sided with the former. It is in accordance with this position that he presents a rational argument to show the necessity of our getting out of a state of war. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, still retaining the project of establishing the science of politics, he reevaluates the humanist, rhetorical culture. He views the science of politics not as a product of reason alone but as a joint product of reason and passion. Thus it comes about that he relies on both reason and passion to show the possibility of our getting out of a condition of war.

We must add that the *De Cive* account refers to "mutual fear," namely the passion of fear. So, precisely speaking, it occupies an intermediate position between the *Elements* and the *Leviathan* accounts. However, in *De Cive*, not only does Hobbes not refer to "mutual fear" as a passion, but he gives a central role to play to a rational argument based on natural necessity and self-contradiction. He is still far from intentionally relying on both reason and passion. Therefore, the *De Cive* account is much closer to the *Elements* than to the *Leviathan* account.

It still remains to explain an exception Hobbes admits to the natural equality of men. In *Elements* and *De Cive*, he describes reason as one of the "natural faculties" (El: 1, 4, 21) and the "faculties of human nature" (Cive: 1, 1, 89) along with the other faculties not only of the mind but also of the body. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, where the relative importance of reason diminishes with the rise of the relative importance of eloquence, he counts reason among acquired, as opposed to natural, wits. He divides the faculties of the mind into three different groups. One is a native faculty, which men have from their birth. According to Hobbes, it is nothing else but sense. The other two are "natural wit" and "acquired wit." He calls that wit natural which men attain by

experience only, without method. One such wit is prudence. On the other hand, he calls that wit acquired which men attain by method. It is “none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech, and produceth the Sciences” (Lev: 8, 13, 138). In accordance with this division, when he talks about the natural equality of men with regard to their faculties of the mind, he admits reason as an exception. Or, as he puts it, he sets aside “the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els” (Ibid., 13, 2, 183). By contrast, in the earlier two works, where he makes no such division as he makes in *Leviathan*, he admits no exception to the natural equality of the men’s faculties of the mind.

Furthermore, the difference just mentioned between *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and *Leviathan*, on the other, is related to that change in the presentation of argument which we have discussed above in this section. In the earlier two works, Hobbes describes our turning from war to peace as a logical consequence of rational argument, and talks about the necessity of our getting out of a state of war. That is, he presents an argument that appeals to reason, which is supposed to be equally shared by everyone. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, he admits that there is inequality among men with regard to that faculty called reason. What is more, he holds that science, a product of reason, is a skill “which very few have, and but in few things.” Accordingly, he turns to both reason and passion and talks about not the necessity but the possibility of our getting out of a condition of war.

3 Natural Right and Law without Nature

In section 1, we have identified the two major differences between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account of the state of nature and the *Leviathan* account of the condition of nature. Having dealt with one of the two differences in section 2, here in section 3, we deal with the other difference and related matters. To review the difference in question, it is a difference of how he derives the conclusion that the state or condition of nature is a state or condition of war. In *Elements* and *De Cive*, he combines the premise of the men’s natural offensiveness (premise (a)) with the premise of the natural right to everything (premise (b)) to derive the conclusion. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, he draws the conclusion immediately from premise (a) alone. Accordingly, in *Elements* and *De Cive*, he introduces the concept of natural right as a right that belongs to people in the state of nature in the course of his proof that the state of nature is a state of war, whereas in *Leviathan*, he introduces the concept of natural right as a right that belongs to people in a condition of war after he has completed the proof that the condition of nature is a condition of war.

How is it that a difference like this has emerged between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account and the *Leviathan* account? Let us remember here the distinction we have introduced in section 1.1 of this paper between the normative and the factual concepts of nature. If only we can show that, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes has got rid of the normative concept of nature, which he still retained in *Elements* and *De Cive*, it is not difficult to answer the question. In *Leviathan*, where the normative

concept no longer has any place, premise (b), which is formulated in terms of such a concept, ceases to have a role to play in the proof that the condition of nature is a condition of war. Our task for the rest of this paper is to show that it is actually the case that he has got rid of the normative concept.

3.1 Natural right

His getting rid of the normative concept of nature reveals itself, when we compare the definitions of natural right Hobbes gives in *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and the definition in *Leviathan*, on the other. Before looking at them, let us introduce the distinction between two different senses of right: the objective and the subjective sense. It is a distinction involved when we describe a state of affairs as being right, on the one hand, and when we describe a man as having rights, on the other.

Hobbes defines the right of nature in *Elements*, *De Cive* and *Leviathan* as follows respectively.

And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire *bonum sibi*, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death, ...; it is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbs, both from death and pain. And that which is not against reason, men call RIGHT, or *jus*, or blameless liberty of using our own natural power and ability. It is therefore *a right of nature*: that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he hath. (El: 14, 6, 78-9)

For each man is driven to desire what is good for him [*bonum sibi*], and to avoid what is evil for him [*malum sibi*], and most of all the greatest of natural evils, which is death; this happens no less by a certain necessity of nature than a stone falls downward by the same necessity. It is not, therefore, absurd, nor reprehensible, nor against right reason [*rectam rationem*], if anyone makes every effort to defend and preserve his own body and limbs from death and pains. And that which is not against right reason is something that all say is done justly and *rightly* [*iuste, & Iure*]. For the name *Right* [*Iuris*] signifies nothing else but the liberty each man has of using his natural faculties in accordance with right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural *Right* [*Juris naturalis*] is that *each man protect his life and limbs as much as he can*. (Cive: 1, 7, 94)

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call *Jus Naturale*, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (Lev: 14, 1, 189)

The three definitions agree in describing the right of nature as the liberty each man has to use his power for the preservation of his life, or, in other words, as a right in the subjective sense. However, there is a great difference between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account and the *Leviathan* account of natural right. In the earlier two works, Hobbes attempts to ground natural right on

reason and ultimately on nature. Natural right to self-preservation is grounded on the fact that it is not against reason for anyone to seek his preservation, which in turn is grounded on the fact that it is by the necessity of nature that anyone seeks his preservation. To put it conversely, he argues as follows. It is in accordance with nature and hence not against reason for anyone to seek his preservation, therefore, it is natural right that anyone seeks his preservation. What is remarkable about this argument for natural right is this: natural right presented there has an element not only of right in the subjective but also in the objective sense. That is, not only is the argument supposed to establish that everyone has a right to seek his preservation but it also implies that it is right for everyone to seek his preservation. This means that nature on which Hobbes grounds natural right is nature of such a kind as to serve as a foundation for the normative statement that seeking self-preservation is right in the objective sense. It is, in other words, nature in the normative sense. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, where he does not refer to such nature as serves as a ground of natural right, natural right presented there has no longer an element of right in the objective sense. It is purely a right in the subjective sense.

Thus, the right of nature has changed both in its aspect as “right” and in its aspect as “of nature.” To repeat the points, natural right, as Hobbes describes it in *Elements* and *De Cive*, has nature in the normative sense as its foundation and has an element of right in the objective sense. By contrast, natural right, as he describes it in *Leviathan*, does not have nature in the normative sense as its foundation nor has an element of right in the objective sense. It is purely a right in the subjective sense.

The difference in question leads to the contrasting characterizations of reason in *Elements* and *De Cive*, on the one hand, and in *Leviathan*, on the other. There are two interrelated points to note. First, in the earlier two works, reason, which is situated between natural right and nature, works as a medium through which Hobbes grounds the natural right of self-preservation on nature. In *Leviathan*, where he does not refer to such nature as serves as a ground of natural right, reason ceases to function as such a medium. Second, in the earlier two works, it is seeking self-preservation that he describes as “not against reason.” Reason takes up seeking self-preservation itself as its subject and establishes that it is right in the objective sense. In *Leviathan*, reason is nothing else but the faculty of reasoning, which works out appropriate *means* to self-preservation. It is beyond its scope to examine whether or not seeking self-preservation is right in itself.⁶

We must add, however, that toward the end of *Elements* Hobbes makes a remarkable comment to the effect that there is no such reason as is connected with nature and serves to establish what is right in the objective sense. The relevant passage is worth quoting at length.

In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what *meum* and *tuum*, what a pound, what a quart, &c. For in these things private judgments may differ, and beget controversy. This common measure, some say, is right

reason: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing to be found or known *in rerum natura*. But commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy, do mean their own. (El: 29, 8, 180-81)⁷

He absolutely denies the existence of right reason. Nevertheless, as far as his treatment in *Elements* and *De Cive* of natural right is concerned, reason on which he relies to establish that seeking self-preservation is a right of nature is nothing else but what he calls right reason in the passage just cited. That is, he has recourse to what may be called right reason argument. This is particularly apparent in *De Cive*, where he talks about natural right in terms of *recta ratio*.⁸

The passage cited above suggests that the denial of right reason leads to an individualist understanding of values. In fact, in *Leviathan*, where Hobbes ceases to have recourse to right reason argument, he gives an individualist definition of natural right: it is the liberty each man has to take any necessary means for his preservation according to “*his own* Judgment, and Reason.” Of course, in *Elements* and *De Cive* too, he admits that each man is the judge of the necessary means for his preservation, finally describing natural right as the liberty each man has to do whatever *he* judges is necessary to his preservation. However, as we shall see in what follows, because of his having recourse to right reason argument, his understanding of natural right falls short of a full-blown individualist one.

In *Elements* and *De Cive*, Hobbes introduces an individualist element into the description of natural right through an argument presented below.

- (1) It is a right of nature for everyone to seek his preservation.
- (2) Since a right to the end implies a right to the necessary means, it is also a right of nature for everyone to do whatever is necessary to his preservation.
- (3) It is a right of nature for everyone to be the judge of the means necessary to his preservation.
- (4) Therefore, it is a right of nature for everyone to do whatever *he* judges is necessary to his preservation. (That is, everyone by nature has a right to everything.)

This is an argument that we have already seen in section 1.1. What is remarkable about this argument is proposition (3), which is the crucial step of the argument. To prove the proposition, he follows the same procedure as he followed before in establishing proposition (1). Just as he argued that it is not against reason and therefore a natural right for anyone to seek his preservation, so he argues that it is not against reason and therefore a natural right for anyone to be the judge of the necessary means for his preservation (El: 14, 8, 79; Cive: 1, 9, 95). This is an argument that relies on such reason as he, officially at least, denies, that is, right reason. So he talks about right not only in the subjective but also in the objective sense. Just as he relied on reason to establish that seeking self-preservation is right in the objective sense, so he relies on reason to establish that being the judge of the necessary means to self-preservation is right in the objective sense.

It is this reliance on right reason and hence reference to right in the objective sense that prevents Hobbes from developing a full-blown individualist understanding of natural right. In this

connection the following passage in *Elements* is worthy of attention.

As a man's judgment, in right of nature, *is to be* employed for his own benefit, so also the strength, knowledge, and art of every man is then *rightly* employed, when he useth it for himself; else must not a man have right to preserve himself. (El: 14, 9, 79, emphasis added)

He says that employing one's judgment for his preservation is right on the grounds that seeking self-preservation is right. It is evident that he talks about right in the objective rather than right in the subjective sense, that is, right in the sense of liberty. Thus, natural right, as Hobbes understands it in *Elements* and *De Cive*, is a liberty, of course, but it is a liberty one exercises within the constraint of right in the objective sense. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, where he ceases to have recourse to right reason and hence to take right in the objective sense into consideration, the liberty in question is free from such constraint. Thus, he first establishes a full-blown individualist understanding of natural right. Decision about what is necessary for one's preservation is left entirely to *his own* judgment.

In connection with the individualist understanding of natural right, we say a few words about a distinction that we have left unexplained. It is a distinction between a right in the state of nature and in a condition of war. In *Elements* and *De Cive*, Hobbes introduces natural right as a right in the state of nature, or, more precisely, as a right that belongs to people in the state of nature. Given that natural right to self-preservation and hence to everything is one premise, which combined with the other premise leads to the conclusion that the state of nature is a state of war, it is a right that is established independent of the fact that the state of nature is a state of war. By contrast, in *Leviathan*, where he introduces natural right as a right in a condition of war, the fact that the condition of nature is a condition of war is essential for the establishment of natural right. According to Hobbes, the life of man in a condition of war is "solitary." It is a condition where man cannot help but live according to *his own* judgment. It is a condition where decision about what is necessary for his preservation is left entirely to *his own* judgment. Thus, natural right in the fully individualist sense of the term is established as a right in a condition of war.

3.2 Natural right and natural law

Let us next take natural law into consideration and compare the *Elements* and *De Cive* account and the *Leviathan* account of the relationship between natural right and law. In all three works, Hobbes describes the basic content of natural law in a similar way. It is a precept that everyone should seek peace if there is any hope of obtaining it. However, when we turn to the definition of natural law, we find that the understanding Hobbes presents in *Leviathan* of natural law and hence of the relationship between natural right and law is quite different from the one in *Elements* and *De Cive*. This difference is largely due to the change in his understanding of reason and nature.

Let us begin with taking a look at the definition of natural law in *Leviathan*.

A LAW OF NATURE, (*Lex Naturalis*,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by

which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound *Jus*, and *Lex*, *Right* and *Law*; yet they ought to be distinguished; because *RIGHT*, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; Whereas *LAW*, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that *Law*, and *Right*, differ as much, as *Obligation*, and *Liberty*; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. (Lev: 14, 3, 189)

What is characteristic of the passage just cited is that Hobbes draws a clear distinction between right and law. He criticises writers on this subject for usually confounding *jus* and *lex*, right and law. As we shall see in what follows, the criticism is directed at Hobbes himself, namely Hobbes as the author of *Elements* and *De Cive*, as well as at other writers.

In the earlier two works, he defines natural law as follows respectively.

Reason is no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely their own good, which is the work of reason. There can therefore be no other law of nature than reason, ... (El: 15, 1, 82)

However, as all men allow that what is done not against right Reason is done *rightly* [*iure fieri*], we ought to hold that what is repugnant to right reason ... is done *injuriously* [*iniuria factum*]. But what is done *injuriously* is something that we say is done against some *law*. *Right Reason*, therefore, is a certain *law*, which (since reason is no less part of human nature than any other faculty or passion of the mind) is also said to be natural. Therefore, *natural law* [*lex naturalis*], as I define it, is the Dictate of right reason concerning what should or should not be done for the longest possible preservation of life and limbs. (Cive: 2, 1, 99)

Hobbes does not, as he does in *Leviathan*, refer to the distinction between right and law.⁹ It is, rather, some similarities or connections between right and law that come to light when we compare the passages just cited with the *Elements* and *De Cive* account of natural right. In the passage cited from *Elements*, he says that "all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to ... their own good." This reminds us of his reference in the definition of natural right to a necessity of nature by which men are driven to desire their own good. More remarkable is the passage cited from *De Cive*, where he says that "what is done not against right Reason is done *rightly* [*iure fieri*]." That is, he repeats the crucial part of the definition of natural right by using almost the same wording, and defines natural law in terms of reason. As is strongly suggested by this repetition, there is no doubt that in his account of natural law he has recourse to the same reason as he does in his account of natural right. It is such reason as functions as an access to nature in the normative sense. It follows, then, that natural law, as well as natural right, has nature in the normative sense as its foundation. In confirmation of this point, let us take a look at his qualifying remarks concerning the definition of natural law. According to Hobbes, the natural

laws, which he refers to as the dictates of reason, are not laws properly so-called, because they are not commands issued by someone who by right has command over others. When he makes this point in *Elements* and *De Cive*, he describes the natural laws or the dictates of reason as proceeding from *nature* (El: 17, 12, 97; Cive: 3, 33, 121), thereby revealing his view that natural law has nature as its ultimate foundation. Now it is true that natural right is defined negatively as “that which is not against reason,” while natural law is defined positively as “reason” or “the Dictate of right reason.” However, given that natural right and law have the same foundation, nature in the normative sense, it is natural that the distinction between them gets blurred. It is this point that Hobbes criticises in *Leviathan*.

Let us return to *Leviathan* and consider the relationship between natural right and law. Natural law, as well as natural right, presented there has no longer nature in the normative sense as its foundation. In fact, the definition of natural law does not make any reference to nature nor contains any remarks implying that nature in the normative sense underlies natural law. Furthermore, the same point is confirmed when we look at his qualifying remarks concerning the definition of natural law. Hobbes says, as he does in the earlier two works, that the natural laws, as he understands them, are not laws properly so-called. On the other hand, he does not describe, as he does in the earlier two works, the natural laws as proceeding from or otherwise connected with *nature* (Lev: 15, 41, 216-7). It is true that Hobbes still defines natural law in terms of reason, that is, as “a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason.” He even uses the expression “dictates of Reason” (Ibid.), not “dictates of *right* reason” though, to refer to natural laws. However, in *Leviathan*, reason does not perform the same function as it does in the earlier two works. Since the normative concept of nature has no place in his account of natural law, it is not such reason as functions as an access to nature in the normative sense. Then, what is it? It is nothing else but that reason in terms of which Hobbes defines natural right. That is, it is a faculty of reasoning according to which each one secures his preservation, and in whose exercise natural right consists. This is apparent when we look at how he derives what he calls “a precept, or generall rule of Reason.” The relevant passage is worth quoting at length.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.* The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, *to seek Peace, and follow it.* The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, *By all means we can, to defend our selves.* (Lev: 14, 4, 189-90)

As we have seen at the end of section 3.1, natural right, as Hobbes describes it in *Leviathan*, is a right in a condition of war. The passage cited above starts with such a description of natural right, and introduces “a precept, or generall rule of Reason,” which consists of two parts: “the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature” and “the summe of the Right of Nature.” Incidentally, the second law of nature prescribes the restriction of natural right as a necessary means for the establishment of peace (Ibid., 5, 190). He introduces this law as an immediate consequence from the first law, which prescribes seeking peace as a necessary means for self-preservation. Now, it is the same reason that is at work throughout this talk about natural right and law. It is the reason by which anyone in a condition of war governs himself, and secures his own preservation, namely the reason in whose exercise natural right consists. This shows us an important thing about the relationship between natural right and law, namely the priority of natural right over law. It is a precept of reason that everyone should seek peace, if there is any hope of obtaining it. As we have just seen, the reason in question is nothing else but that reason in whose exercise natural right consists. Therefore, to follow the fundamental law of nature is itself an exercise of natural right. To put it another way, natural law, which implies the restriction of natural right, has no ground independent of that natural right. In this sense, natural right and law are related in such a way as the former is more fundamental than the other.

Now, in *Elements* and *De Cive*, as well as in *Leviathan*, natural law is a precept which tells us a necessary means for self-preservation. In all three works, it prescribes seeking peace as a necessary means for self-preservation, and prescribes the restriction of natural right as a necessary means for the establishment of peace. However, in *Elements* and *De Cive*, the priority of natural right over law is not so clear as in *Leviathan*. This difference is largely due to the change in the understanding of reason and its relation to natural right and law. As we have just seen, in *Leviathan*, reason, in whose exercise natural right consists, prescribes natural law. Reason is related more closely to natural right than to natural law. By contrast, in the earlier two works, where the normative concept of nature is at work, reason is something by means of which both natural right and law are grounded on nature. Its relation with natural right is not particularly close. In fact, in *Elements*, Hobbes even identifies reason with law. Hence it comes to pass that when he talks about natural law, which implies the restriction of natural right, he seems to present natural law's overruling natural right as something approved by reason and ultimately by nature.

3.3 Traditional and modern natural right

We have seen that there are considerable differences between the *Elements* and *De Cive* account and the *Leviathan* account of natural right and law. As we shall see in what follows, the process of transition from the *Elements* and *De Cive* account to the *Leviathan* account was, in short, the process through which an element of traditional natural right theory, still remaining in the former account, was thrown away and a modern natural right theory was fully established.

Let us start with comparing traditional and modern natural right theory from the terminological viewpoint. In traditional natural right theory, the terms *ius* (right) and *lex* (law), and hence the terms *ius naturale* and *lex naturalis* were used more or less exchangeably as nearly synonyms. As a

reflection of this traditional usage, many present-day European languages still have two different terms used more or less exchangeably to refer to law, that is, the equivalents of *ius* and those of *lex*.

Latin	<i>ius</i>	<i>lex</i>
English	right*	law
German	Recht	Gesetz
French	droit	loi

(*In present-day English, right, the English equivalent of *ius*, is not used to refer to law.)

It is not the case that the two kinds of terms referring to law have exactly the same meaning. To put it rough, *ius* and its equivalents in other European languages are terms that concentrate on the aspect of law as a specification of what is right, whereas *lex* and its equivalents are terms that concentrate on its aspect as a body of rules. Thus, *ius* and its equivalents, on the one hand, and *lex* and its equivalents, on the other, are terms that look at the same thing, law, from two different aspects. This is why they are used more or less exchangeably to refer to law. Let us remember here the distinction between right in the objective and subjective sense. *Ius* and its equivalents, when used exchangeably with *lex* and its equivalents, signify right in the objective sense. This is generally the case with traditional natural right theory. However, *ius* and its equivalents also signify right in the subjective sense. In this case, they cannot be used exchangeably with *lex* and its equivalents. It is characteristic of modern natural right theory that it attaches *ius* and its equivalents the subjective, as opposed to the objective, sense, thereby distinguishing them from *lex* and its equivalents.

Now, it is not the case that modern natural right theory began with Hobbes.¹⁶ He is one of the seventeenth-century, modern natural right theorists. In fact, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is commonly considered the father of modern natural right (law) theory. His ideas had a great impact especially in England, where John Selden (1584-1654) and other members of the Great Tew circle, including Dudley Digges (1583-1639), developed natural right theories similar to Grotius's. Furthermore, the seventeenth-century natural right theorists had their precursors, that is, late medieval and early modern theorists, such as Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and Francis Suárez (1548-1617). As is suggested by the fact that Gerson defined both *ius* and *lex* in terms of *recta ratio*, he was still within the framework of traditional natural right theory. However, much earlier than the seventeenth-century theorists, he had already referred to the distinction between *ius* and *lex*.

Returning to Hobbes's contemporaries, the Great Tew circle writers are particularly important. Selden presents a natural right theory based on a strongly individualistic view of man. Several other members of the circle, such as Dudley Digges, followed Selden. Where the terminology of right and law is concerned, Digges is specially worth mentioning. He makes a statement about the confusion between right and law, and the necessity of distinguishing them.

If we looke backe to the law of Nature, we shall finde that the people would have had a clearer and most distinct notion of it, if common use of calling it *Law* had not helped to confound their understanding, when it ought to have been named the *Right* of nature; for *Right* and *Law* differ as much as Liberty and Bonds: *Jus*, or right not laying any obligation,

but signifying, we may equally choose to do or not to do without fault, whereas *Lex* or law determines us either to a particular performance by way of command, or a particular abstinence by way of prohibition; ...¹¹

As we have seen at the beginning of section 3.2, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes makes a statement to the same effect in very similar terms. Furthermore, he makes earlier versions of the statement in *Elements* and *De Cive*.

The names *lex*, and *jus*, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded; and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth us; and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another's liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different than restraint and liberty, which are contrary; ... (El: 19, 5, 179)

There is thus a great difference between *law* [*legem*] and *right* [*ius*]; for *law* is a *bond* [*vinculum*], *right* is a *liberty* [*libertas*], and they differ as contraries. (Cive: 14, 3, 207)

His association with the Great Tew circle writers in the 1630s strongly suggests that it was through them that he acquainted himself with the distinction between right and law.¹² Incidentally, some of them, including Selden and Digges, had been connected with the Virginia Company, whose board meetings Hobbes himself had attended with William Cavendish, a son of his employer the first Earl of Devonshire. So it is reasonable to suppose that he had been acquainted with Selden and Digges before the 1630s, since the early 1620s.¹³

All three works, *Elements*, *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, in so far as they refer to the distinction between right and law, have a characteristic of modern natural right theory. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a modern natural right theory was fully established already in *Elements* and *De Cive*. In fact, there is at least an apparent difference between the earlier two works and *Leviathan*. In the earlier two works, Hobbes refers to the distinction in the chapters that are far distant from those where he deals with natural right and law. He gives the definition of natural right and law in Chapters 14 and 15 of *Elements*, and in Chapters 1 and 2 of *De Cive* respectively. However, it is in Chapter 29 of *Elements*, which is the final chapter of the book, and in Chapter 14 of *De Cive*, which is the final chapter of Part 2 of the book, that he refers to the distinction. In the *Leviathan* counterpart of these two chapters, too, namely in Chapter 26, he refers to the distinction. However, what is characteristic of *Leviathan* is that he refers to it much earlier in the very chapter where he defines natural right and law, namely in Chapter 15.

Moreover, as we have seen in sections 3.1 and 3.2, in *Leviathan*, where Hobbes has got rid of the normative concept of nature, he presents such an understanding of natural right, law and their relationship as is quite different from the one in *Elements* and *De Cive*. To recapitulate the points we have already made, first, natural right, as he describes it in the earlier two works, has nature in the normative sense as its foundation and has an element of right in the objective sense, which is a characteristic of traditional natural right theory. By contrast, natural right, as he describes it

in *Leviathan*, does not have nature in the normative sense as its foundation nor has an element of right in the objective sense. Natural right he presents there is one characteristic of modern natural right theory, namely a right in the subjective sense. More specifically, it is a right in the full individualist sense. Second, it is also in *Leviathan* that he comes to present unmistakably the relationship between right and law as one of priority of right over law.

It is true that, in *Elements* and *De Cive*, Hobbes refers to the distinction between right and law. However, it is only in *Leviathan*, where he has got rid of the normative concept of nature, that he appreciates its significance and fully establishes a modern natural right theory. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose that he has himself as the author of *Elements* and *De Cive* in mind when he makes a statement in *Leviathan* about the confusion prevalent among writers between right and law. He criticises himself in the past, when he still retained the normative concept of nature and had not entirely broken with traditional natural right theory.¹⁴

Conclusion

As we have seen in section 2 of this paper, in *Leviathan*, where Hobbes has returned to the humanist, rhetorical culture, he gives quite a different manner of argument to explain how we get out of a condition of war. As we have seen in section 3, in *Leviathan*, where he has got rid of the normative concept of nature, he presents quite a different understanding of natural right and hence of the relationship between natural right and law. Furthermore, his having got rid of the normative concept of nature implies that the difference between the *sate* of nature and the *condition* of nature is not a mere terminological difference. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes completely revised the theory of nature he had presented in *Elements* and *De Cive*.

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On the Citizen, (a new English translation of *De Cive*), edited and translated by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

In referring to the works of Hobbes, I have used abbreviated title, normally followed by chapter, section/paragraph, and page number.

Cive=*De Cive*

El=*The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*

Lev=*Leviathan*

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NOTES

1. According to the standard interpretation of Hobbes, apart from the change in his attitude toward religion, there is no substantial difference between the three political works, *Elements*, *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. However, Ludwig has recently shown that his political philosophy as a whole underwent a dramatic development during his time of exile in Paris, that is, the time between *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. See Ludwig 1998.
2. For the following description of Hobbes's intellectual formation, I am indebted to Skinner 1996, Introduction, Chaps. 1, 2 and 6, and Martinich 1999, Chaps. 2, 3, and 4.

3. See Johnston 1986 and Skinner 1996. These two works are based on the same basic idea that the distance between Hobbes and the humanist, rhetorical culture changes as time advances.
4. In this passage, Hobbes introduces eloquence as a concept more comprehensive than rhetoric, and describes the end of rhetoric, rather than of eloquence, as victory or mere persuasion. However, elsewhere in *De Cive*, he describes the end of eloquence as victory.
... *Eloquence* itself, whose end (as all the masters of Rhetoric teach) is not truth (except by accident) but victory; ... (Cive: 10, 11, 178)
5. For the exception, see section 1.2 of this paper.
6. It might seem that, in the passages we have cited from *Elements* and *De Cive*, Hobbes talks not only about self-preservation itself but also about means to it. However, given that, in each of the two works, he newly introduces means to self-preservation in the section that immediately follows (El: 14, 7, 79; Cive: 1, 8, 94), that is not the case.
7. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes also talks about “want of a right Reason constituted by Nature” (Lev: 5, 3, 111). For a reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy that pays special attention to his denial of right reason, see Ewin 1991.
8. Interestingly enough, in *De Cive*, where Hobbes often uses the term *recta ratio* throughout the book, he does not explicitly deny, as he does in *Elements* and *Leviathan*, the existence of right reason. It is only in an annotation added in the second edition of *De Cive* that he makes a comment related to such denial (Cive: 2, annotation to 1, 99).
9. As we shall see in section 3.3, elsewhere in *Elements* and *De Cive*, Hobbes refers to the distinction.
10. For the following description about the natural right theories in the seventeenth century and before, I am indebted to Tuck 1979, chaps. 1 to 5, and Haakonssen 1996, chap. 1.
11. *The Unlawfulness of Subjects, Taking up Armes against their Sovereigne* (1644), cited in Tuck 1989: 102-3.
12. Though *Unlawfulness*, in which Digges asserts the necessity of distinguishing between right and law, was published in 1644, he had died in 1639, the year before the publication of *Elements*.
13. For Hobbes’s involvement with the Virginia Company and the Great Tew circle, see Martinich 1999: 60-4, 102-4.
14. For that characterization of modern natural right theory which contrasts it with such an understanding of natural right as is based on the supposition that nature is the standard, see Strauss 1953, chaps. 3-5.