本研究は、日本法において、習律を独立した規範カテゴリとして承認すべきか、つまり多元論を承認すべきか否かを問うものである。本研究では第一に、J. A. G. Griffithの政治的立憲主義の特徴を析出することにより、想定される多元論批判が当面しうる問題を特定できた。第二に、イギリス法実証主義に与するJ. Goldsworthyの憲法理論の特徴を浮き彫りにすることにより、法学方法論上、憲法と習律を区別すべき理由を解明できた。第三に、T. R. S. AllanやA. Heardの一元論の主張構造を吟味しそれとの対話を重ねることにより、多元論が当面すべき課題を特定できた。
The purpose of this study is to inquire whether Japanese constitution can accept a distinction between law and conventions of the constitution, namely, constitutional pluralism of law and conventions.
First, this study showed the issues including nihilism which opponents of the pluralism would have to confront, by analysing the nature of political constitutionalism articulated by J. A. G. Griffith. Second, this study showed the reason why law of the constitution should be severely separated from conventions of the constitution, by exploring J. Goldsworthy’s constitutional theory. The rationales behind the legal positivism which Goldsworthy are committed to seemed to suggest the reason.Thirdly, this study showed some problems which the pluralism would be compelled to resolve, by scrutinising constitutional monism, which gives priority to law of the constitution, and engaging in dialogue with it.
習律の基礎づけ―日英加仏の比較法的視点から
2020RP0002
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