In the Abstract of his Treatise of Human nature, David Hume, talking about the principles of association of ideas, says that “they are really to us the cement of the universe.” Given that causation is one of the principles of association, it was a point of his theory of causation to show that causation, which makes it possible for us to cement one objects with another in the universe, resolves itself into association of ideas. This aspect of his theory of causation may be called the ‘cement of the universe’view.
In the Abstract, talking about “a defect in the common system of logic,” which pays much less attention to probabilities than to demonstrations, Hume says that he “has endeavoured, as much as he can, to supply it [the defect],” Given that, Part 3 of Book 1 of the Treatise, entitled “Of Knowledge and Probability,” is composed largely of discussions concerning causation, it was another point of his theory of causation to establish the logic of probability.
In this paper, I argue that his epistemological, rather than metaphysical, interest in causation led Hume to develop his theory of causation as the ‘cement of the universe’ view, on the one hand, and the logic of probability, on the other. In connection with this, I also take up the so-called “New Hume” debate, a debate as to the appropriateness of the interpretation of Hume as a causal relist, and argue that insofar as such a metaphysical issue as whether or not causation exists, independent of us, in objects was not a central concern of his theory of causation, the realist interpretations miss the mark.
雑誌名
三重大学教育学部研究紀要 自然科学・人文科学・社会科学・教育科学・教育実践
雑誌名(英)
Bulletin of the Faculty of Education, Mie University. Natural Science, Humanities, Social Science, Education, Educational Practice
「宇宙のセメント」説と蓋然性の論理学 －ヒュームの因果論の二側面－
2021BS0014.pdf
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